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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals upholding an Order
of the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss an Order to Show Cause and
extending Defendant's formal AP&P probation. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction
of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a). The Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded on the length of probation ordered (ten years). State v. Orr, 2004 UT App
413, Add. 6.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL, STANDARD OF APPELLATE
REVIEW AND PRESERVATION BELOW
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County in and for the State of Utah
wrongfully denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Order to Show Cause and erroneously
ruled the Court had jurisdiction to extend the Defendant's probation for a period often years
(minus three years previously served on probation). "Whether the trial court had the
authority to extend Defendant's probation is a question of law. We accord a trial court's
conclusions of law no particular deference, reviewing them for correctness." State v. Wilcox,
808 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1991); State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 463-4 (Utah 1988). Also,
"(b)ecause the interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, we review for
correctness." State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Grate, 947
P.2d 1161, 1164 (Utah App. 1997).

1

This Court granted a Petition of Certiorari as to the following issues:
1.
Whether the due process concerns recited in State v. Call 980
P.2d 201,203 (Utah 1999) require that a probationer be notified of the State's
intent to seek revocation, modification or extension of probation prior to the
expiration of the existing probation term.
2.
Whether the district court made adequate findings, and whether
the district court must find a probation violation is willful to impose an
extension of probation.
Add. 1.
These issues were preserved in the lower court upon the Defendant's filing of a
Motion to Dismiss Order to Show Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction and Memorandum in
Support thereof, and oral argument relating to said Motion, as well as the Judge's ruling
denying Defendant's Motion (R. 234-378, 481; 386-394, Add. 2).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
The following are relevant to the issues presented on appeal and are attached as
Addendum 3 :
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (2000)
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition below

Defendant David J. Orr was initially charged with twenty-eight felonies including
Securities Fraud, Communications Fraud, Unregistered Securities Agent and Pattern of
Unlawful Activity (R. 2-8). On March 23,2000, Defendant entered a Change of Plea to the
2

amended charge of Attempted Securities Fraud, a third degree felony (Count 8) and
Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent, a third degree felony (Count 20) (R. 20-21). On May
12, 2000, Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson to two
indeterminate terms not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison to run consecutively.
At the same time, the Court suspended the prison terms and placed Defendant on probation
for three years to be supervised by the Utah Adult Probation & Parole Department ("AP&P")
with numerous conditions, including that Defendant serve six months in the Salt Lake County
Jail with no credit for time served, and pay restitution as determined by his probation officer.
Defendant was required to pay no less than $1,000.00 per month toward restitution or 25%
of his income under the direction of AP&P (R. 22-27).
Defendant performed satisfactorily during his three years (36 months) of probation,
but on May 13,2003, Court records show that an AP&P Progress/Violation Report was filed
with the Court (R. 228-229). On May 19,2003, an Order to Show Cause was entered by the
Third District Court (signed on May 13,2003 by Judge Hanson) alleging that the Defendant
had violated the terms and conditions of his probation "by having failed to pay restitution in
full, as ordered, in violation of a special condition of the Probation Agreement." (Add. 4 &
5) (R. 230-231,232-233). On or about May 23, 2003, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss
Order to Show Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction and a Memorandum in Support thereof (R.
234-378).
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The Court held a hearing on June 23,2003 and denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
from the Bench (R. 3 83-3 84).l The Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order on July
2,2003 formally denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and ruling
that the Court had jurisdiction and authority to extend Defendant's probation for a maximum
often years because the Court had sentenced the Defendant to two 0-5 year terms in the Utah
State Prison, and had suspended those terms (Add. 2, R. 386-394). The Court also concluded
that it was not required to place the Defendant on a bench probation as argued by the
Defendant under the provisions of U.C.A. § 77-18-10(a)(ii)(A) (sic) "because the
Defendant's probation did not expire or terminate under § 77-18-10(a)(i) (sic), but was
instead tolled under § 77-18-1(1 l)(b)" (Add. 2, p. 6, R. 391).
Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal from the Court's Decision on July 9, 2003 (R.
395-396). The Utah Court of Appeals issued its Opinion for official publication in Case No.
20030574-CA on November 12,2004 upholding the trial court's determination that the trial
court had properly extended Defendant Orr's probation but reversing and remanding with
direction that the trial court amend Orr's probation order to a period of no greater than three
years rather than the ten years originally entered. Orr, \ 16, Add. 6.
This Court granted a Petition of Certiorari as to the following issues:

1

The district court apparently combined the hearing on the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss with the Probation Revocation hearing, although Defendant was not asked to
admit or deny the allegations in the Order to Show Cause and no evidence was presented
as to the Defendant's willful failure to pay restitution. Further the Judge made no specific
written findings on the issues raised by Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
4

1.
Whether the due process concerns recited in State v. Call 980
P.2d201,203 (Utah 1999) require that a probationer be notified of the State's
intent to seek revocation, modification or extension of probation prior to the
expiration of the existing probation term.
2.
Whether the district court made adequate findings, and whether
the district court must find a probation violation is willful to impose an
extension of probation.
Add. 1.
B.

Statement of the Facts

1.

Defendant David J. Orr was originally charged with twenty-eight felonies

under the securities laws of the State of Utah (R. 2-8).
2.

On or about March 23, 2000, Defendant waived preliminary hearing and

entered a plea of guilty to Attempted Securities Fraud, a third degree felony (Count 8
amended) and Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent (Count 20) also a third degree felony (R.
20-21).
3.

On May 12, 2000, the Defendant appeared before the Honorable Timothy R.

Hanson and was sentenced to two terms not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison with
the sentences to run consecutively. The Court suspended the prison terms and placed the
Defendant on probation under certain specific conditions, including that the Defendant was
required to pay restitution as determined by the Adult Probation & Parole Department.
Defendant was required to pay no less than $1,000.00 per month toward his restitution, or
25% of his income, under the direction of the Adult Probation & Parole Department. The
Court indicated a restitution hearing could be set upon appropriate application (R. 22-24,2529).
5

4.

No report or allegation of probation violation was filed with the court between

May 12, 2000 and May 13, 2003, except for the agent's testimony he filed his
Progress/Violation Report on May 9, but someone at the court changed the date on the
document to May 13. (R. 481, p. 11-14).
5.

Court records indicate that on May 13,2003, a Progress/Violation Report and

Affidavit was filed by Probation Officer Robert Egelund requesting that the Court issue an
Order to Show Cause requiring Defendant Orr to appear and show cause, if any he has, why
his probation should not be revoked and he be committed to the Utah State Prison for the
indeterminate term as provided by law, the execution of which had been previously stayed
by the Court, "(B)y virtue of his having failed to pay restitution in full, as ordered, in
violation of a special condition of the probation agreement." (R. 228-229, Add. 2,230-231).
This was despite the fact that he paid monthly payments faithfully until instructed by his
lawyer on May 12,2003 that his probation terminated by operation of law. (R. 1, p. 32,1.1116).
6.

The Defendant was served with the Affidavit and Order to Show Cause on May

19, 2003 requiring him to appear before the Court on May 30, 2003 at 9:00 a.m. by Agent
Egelund. (Add. 5, p. 2, R. 232-233).
7.

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Order to Show Cause and

Memorandum in Support thereof for lack ofjurisdiction on or about May 22,2003 (R. 234235, 236-378).

6

8.

On or about June 23, 2003, the Court held a hearing regarding Defendant's

Motion to Dismiss at which the Defendant was present and represented by his attorney Larry
R. Keller and the State was present through its attorney Assistant Salt Lake County District
Attorney Howard R. Lemcke, Jr. (R. 383-384).
9.

The Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on or about July 2,2003

(Add. 2, R. 386-394).
10.

Defendant Orr filed his Notice of Appeal on July 9, 2003 (R. 395-396).

11.

The Utah Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum Opinion on November 12,

12.

This Court granted Certiorari on March 30, 2005 {See Add. 1).

2004.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is the position of Defendant that his probation ended by operation of law on May
12, 2003, and the court lost jurisdiction over him at that time because he was not provided
notice of the court's action to extend, modify or terminate probation until May 19, 2003.
This Court's decisions in State v. Call, 980 P.2d 201 (Utah 1999), State v. Green, 757 P.2d
462 (Utah 1988), and Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) all stand for the proposition
that a probationer is entitled to due process of law which requires that the State must take
definitive action to extend the term of his probation before the expiration date of the
probation and the probationer must be given notice of that intent prior to said expiration date.
In Defendant Orr's case, definitive action was not taken until May 13, 2003 and Defendant

7

intentionally was not notified by his probation officer until May 19,2003 of the court's intent
to take action to extend his probation.
Defendant also contends that the trial court had no authority to extend his probation
because it did not enter any finding that he had violated a condition of his probation, let alone
any finding that such a violation was willful. Defendant relies on this Court's decision in
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979) and the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in
State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) for this proposition. Defendant
maintains that without a finding of a willful violation of probation, a probationer's probation
may not extended, modified or revoked if he has otherwise satisfied his original conditions
of probation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

DEFENDANT'S PROBATION ENDED BY OPERATION OF
LAW ON MAY 12, 2003, AND THE COURT LOST
JURISDICTION OVER HIM AT THAT TIME, BECAUSE HE
WAS NOT PROVIDED NOTICE OF THE COURT'S ACTION
UNTIL MAY 19, 2003.

Although there was controversy in the trial court regarding the precise date that
documents prepared by AP&P were "filed", there was no conflicting evidence regarding the
date upon which the Defendant was served with notice of the Order to Show Cause. The
Defendant was served on May 19, 2003, at least seven days after his probation should have
terminated by operation of law according to the Court's records (Add. 5, p. 2, R. 232, 233).
Furthermore, Agent Egelund testified at the hearing in the above-entitled matter that he did
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not serve the Defendant until May 19,2003 because "(T)hat was the soonest I was going to
see him." Mr. Egelund admitted that he didn't make any extra effort to notify him of the
Order to Show Cause hearing and the possibility that the Court would revoke, extend or
modify his probation until May 19th. (R. 481, p. 22,1. 8-20). Furthermore, Agent Egelund
admitted that he informed the Defendant prior to May 12, 2003 that his intention was to
recommend to Judge Hanson that his probation be terminated and the matter of restitution
be handled through the civil process as a judgment (R. 481, p. 22,1. 21-25, p. 23,1. 1-14).
In addition to the foregoing, the Court itself, in making its comments at the Order to
Show Cause hearing on June 23, 2003, made the following statement:
THE COURT: Mr. Keller, when Mr. Egelund came down he says, "Mr. Orr's
probation is going to terminate. We don't want to deal with him any more,"
and I said, "Wrong. I want you to deal with him. I want probation to continue,
because he won't pay unless I am holding the prison term over his head,"
which is evidenced by the fact that he apparently hasn't made the May
payment or the June payment.
(R. 481, p. 30,1.3-9).
Therefore, the evidence is clear that Defendant was led by his probation officer to
believe that the probation officer was going to recommend termination and that his probation
would be terminated and he would be required to continue to pay restitution as part of the
civil process. It was a shock to Defendant when he was served with the Order to Show
Cause on May 19,2003.
It is the contention of Defendant that his probation ended by operation of law on May
12, 2003, and the Court lost jurisdiction over him at that time, because he was not provided
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notice of the Court's action until May 19, 2003. In State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah
App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals held that a trial court lost jurisdiction to initiate
probation extension proceedings against the probationer upon expiration ofprobation. In that
case, Defendant had been sentenced on October 11, 1985 after pleading guilty to a single
count of attempted sodomy on a child, a first degree felony. Defendant's probation was to
expire by operation of law on May 6, 1987 by virtue of his having completed eighteen
months on probation. Although the Adult Probation & Parole department generated a
memorandum directed to the trial court which suggested extending the Defendant's probation
because he needed to continue in treatment, no motion was filed or made by the AP&P agent
or prosecutor to extend Defendant's probation. The Court of Appeals there noted that,
although the trial court was apparently made aware of the recommendation and a hearing was
scheduled, the Defendant received nothing in writing and only learned of the hearing when
advised thereof casually by a hospital aid two days before the hearing date. The court then
extended Defendant's probation for an additional eighteen months. Id. at 1065.
The Utah Court of Appeals held that "(I)t is well settled that a probationer shall be
accorded due process at revocation proceedings because revoking probation seriously
deprives a person or his or her liberty." (citations omitted)... Id. at 1067. . Although the
Court went on to note that the matter was less clear with regard to probation extension
proceedings, "...because of the high risk of prejudice to the probationer when he or she is not
given notice of the extension hearing and the hearing is conducted ex-parte, these courts have
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invoked their supervisory powers requiring the necessary parties to (1) give the probationer
notice of the extension hearing; (2) advise the probationer that he or she has a right to a
hearing and/or (3) advise the probationer that he or she has the right to the assistance of
counsel." (citations omitted) Id. at 1067.
The Court then specifically ruled: "We hold that a probationer in the State of Utah is
accorded a measure of due process at a probation extension proceeding and is thus entitled
to the available protections." Id.
In the instant case, Defendant Orr was not notified of any type of action being taken
against him until May 19, 2003, seven days after his probation terminated by operation of
law.
This issue was elucidated even more clearly by the Utah Court of Appeals in the case
of State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1997). In that case, defendant was sentenced
on January 16, 1987 to 1-15 years in prison and was placed on 18 months probation. The
Adult Probation & Parole Department filed an Incident Report with the trial court on June
12,1987 alleging Grate had violated his probation by being arrested for auto burglary. Grate
had been arrested on July 8, 1987 on the court's bench warrant based upon the Incident
Report and the court noted that Grate's 18-month probation period was due to terminate on
July 15, 1988. However, because AP&P did not file its Affidavit in Support of an Order to
Show Cause until July 21,1988 and Grate was not served with the Order to Show Cause
until August 9, 1988 the court ultimately ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction to
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proceed with the Order to Show Cause as defendant's probation had terminated by operation
of law on July 15, 1988.
In the Grate case, the Court of Appeals stated:
Under Utah law, it is the notice to a person of the commencement of a judicial
enforcement action that distinguishes the filing of an information in a criminal
proceeding or the issuance of an OSC in a probation setting, from the filing of
an incident report. In each of the former instances, there is no ambiguity as to
the State's intention to enforce its rights within a judicial proceeding or the
defendant's need to prepare a defense. Furthermore, all the procedural
structures which attach to a court proceeding are activated.
In contrast, the filing of an incident report does not commence a probation
revocation proceeding. See, Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-29(1) (1987). Such
report need not be served on the probationer, nor does the filing necessarily
activate any court proceeding or require the probationer to respond. See
Id. Indeed, a probationer may never learn about the filing of such a report...
. rather, it is only when a probationer is served with an OSC that the
probationer receives actual notice of the state's decision to proceed
against the probationer for any violations....
(Emphasis supplied) 947 P.2d at 1165.
The Court of Appeals found that the critical element involved in the process was
notice to the probationer that action was to be taken against him. The court went on to state:
Most obviously, the notice must inform the probationer of the specific
violations the state believes he or she has committed. Equally important,
however, is that such notice inform the probationer that he or she is being rather than may at some future date be - called into court to respond to the
state's allegations . . .
However, Grate received no notice within his initial probation term of an
imminent need to appear in court to respond to those allegations....
We conclude that a probationer is not charged with a probation violation
within § 77-18-l(8)(a) until he or she has received written notice both of
the nature of the allegations against him or her and of the pendency of an
12

enforcement action in the trial court requiring a response. We further
conclude that because Grate was not charged with a probation violation within
the original term of his probation, his probation terminated as a matter of law
on July 15,1988, such that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke Grate's
probation on August 12,1988. We therefore reverse the trial court's denial of
Grate's 1999 Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence.
(Emphasis supplied). 947 P.2d at 1168.
In the Grate case, the Court of Appeals analyzed the previous cases of this Court
which it believed supported its decision in that case. The Court of Appeals looked at Smith
v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) and noted that this Court had reviewed a proceeding in
which an affidavit supporting an Order to Show Cause was filed within the probationer's
term but the Order to Show Cause was not served on the probationer until after that term had
expired. The Grate court observed ". . . In rejecting the state's argument that filing of the
affidavit tolled the running of the probationer's term, the court focused on both 'the nature
and degree of notice to which an individual is entitled (under §77-18-1) prior to a revocation
hearing.' Id. at 795". 947 P.2d at 1166.
As the Grate court noted, this Court in Smith v. Cook concluded
. . . (T)hat the "emphasis on notice . . . is consistent with the assertion that a
court retains authority to revoke probation if the probationer is served with
notice of the revocation proceedings within the probation period" and that the
"assertion that a probationer is entitled to notice within the period of probation
in order for the court to retain the authority to revoke probation is consistent
with the rationale underlying our decision in Green'' Cook, 803 P.2d at 795
(emphasis added). This court later reiterated that proper notice must be
"'reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.'" Rawlings, 893 P.2d at 1069 (emphasis added) (quoting
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted)).
(Emphasis in original) Id. at 1166.
13

This decision in State v. Grate by the Utah Court of Appeals was handed down on
October 30, 1997. It should be noted that the tolling statute relied upon by the district court
in the instant case, Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(11 )(b) (1996) (as amended in 1989) was in full
force and effect. The Utah Court of Appeals in that case reversed a trial court that had
denied Grate's motion (essentially a motion to dismiss the probation revocation proceedings)
on the basis that the filing of the Incident Report on June 12, 1987 had tolled the running of
Grate's probation under § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) until the OSC was signed on July 19, 1988. The
trial court had rejected Grate's claim that the tolling of the probation period without notice
to him had violated his due process rights. As indicated, the Court of Appeals reversed.
The Grate court considered this tolling provision of Utah law and determined that it
had no force and effect because of the failure of the State of Utah to have served the
defendant with the Order to Show Cause until several days after his probation was due to
terminate. Because the defendant was denied legal notice, it was a violation of his right to
fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
See, Grate at 1163, 1167.2

2

Although the Utah Court of Appeals ruled in the case of State v. Reedy, 937 P.2d
152 (Utah App. 1997) that § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) (1995) prevented the court from being
required to dismiss that particular case for lack of jurisdiction because a violation report
was filed with a trial court and a warrant for the defendant's arrest was issued, the court
found that the defendant had "made service impracticable since he left Utah without
permission and was in California when he claims he should have been served." Id. at
153. Because this case was decided several months prior to the Grate case, and because it
is clear that the defendant had left the jurisdiction and could not be served with the
court's proposed action violating his probation, Defendant Orr maintains that this case is
14

The district court in the instant case relied on this same tolling provision of the Utah
Code to deny Defendant Orr's Motion to Dismiss (Add. 4, p. 7, R. 392). It is clear that
Defendant Orr was not served with notice of AP&P's Incident Report and the OSC until
seven days after his probation ended by operation of law. This and the fact that he was lulled
into believing that the Adult Probation & Parole Department and the Court would terminate
his probation on May 12, 2003 should be a dispositive factor in this Court's analysis.
Defendant's due process rights under both Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution and the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution were violated in this circumstance, much the same
as defendant Grate's rights were held to have been violated by the Utah Court of Appeals in
his situation.
This Honorable Court weighed in on this important constitutional issue in State v.
Call 980 P.2d 201 (Utah 1999). This Court reiterated the proposition that:
(Prior) cases instruct that if it is the intent of the state to extend the
probationary period beyond its original term, the state must take definitive
action to extend the term before the expiration date, and the probationer
must be given notice of that intent otherwise the probationer is left in a state
of uncertainty, not knowing whether to continue to observe the terms of his
probation.
(Emphasis added). 980 P.2d fl 1 at 203.

inapposite and does not affect the dismissal requested by him. Reedy's due process rights
were essentially waived by his evasion of supervision and leaving the state so he could
not be located to be served. No such facts exist in the instant case. If it were otherwise,
the Grate court surely would have relied on Reedy as precedent. Reedy was decided April
17, 1997 and Grate was decided October 30, 1997. Davis, P.J. sat on both panels.
15

The court cited its previous cases in State v. Green, 157 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988) and
Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) for this proposition, and clearly indicated in Call
that this principle was still good law in this State. However, due to the fact that the defendant
in Call had signed a waiver of personal appearance, and a waiver of his right to a hearing and
an agreement to extend his probation for an additional year prior to the date that the
probation terminated by operation of law, the court ruled against the defendant in that
particular case. Nevertheless, as indicated previously, this court clearly stated that due
process requires that the state must take definitive action to extend the term before the
expiration date of the probation and the probationer must be given notice of that intent.
In Defendant Orr's case, definitive action was not taken until May 13, 2003 and Defendant
wasn't notified until May 19, 2003 of the Court's action.
Defendant Orr was clearly prejudiced in that he did not make his May or June
payments based upon his counsel's advice, thinking his probation had terminated by
operation of law and his case would be handled as a civil matter as advised by his probation
officer, before the officer saw Judge Hanson on the issue. (See R. 1, p. 32,1. 11-16). This
put him in jeopardy with the court and could have resulted in his incarceration. (R. 481, p.
39,1.11-17).
Despite the foregoing, the Court of Appeals in its Memorandum Decision in this
matter made light of and passed over this very important constitutional due process
requirement. After quoting the applicable language regarding this issue from State v. Call,
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supra, the Utah Court of Appeals, clearly understanding the decision of this Court in Call
made the following statement: "We are not convinced that the limited delay between the
filing of the AP&P Violation Report on May 9th and Orr's receipt of notice on May 19th
creates such problems." Orr, If 11 FN. 5.
The very fact that the Utah Court of Appeals in the instant case chose to deal with this
very important Utah and United States Constitutional right to due process of law by a mere
footnote with a cryptic statement that is difficult to fully understand, shows the resultoriented decision that the Utah Court of Appeals had determined to enter in this matter.
There is no analysis nor explanation of any case law or any other principle which suggests
that the decisions of this Court in State v. Call supra, State v. Green, supra, and Smith v.
Cook, supra, not to mention its own decision in State v. Grate, supra, should be based solely
upon the question of the reasonableness of the time that had elapsed between the termination
of the defendant's probation by operation of law, and service of notice on the defendant of
the Order to Show Cause regarding the probation violation.
This failure of the Utah Court of Appeals to review and analyze the Defendant's due
process rights in light of this Court's cases cited in Defendant's Brief as precedent (and cited
herein) as well as its own case precedent establishes clearly that the Court ofAppeals decided
a question of state law in a way that is in conflict with decisions of this Court when it ruled
that Defendant Orr was not entitled to due process of law by receiving notice of the State's
intention to extend the probationary period before its termination by operation of law.
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POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO EXTEND
PROBATION BECAUSE IT DID NOT ENTER ANY FINDING
THAT DEFENDANT VIOLATED A CONDITION OF HIS
PROBATION, LET ALONE ANY FINDING THAT SUCH A
VIOLATION WAS WILLFUL.

Under Utah law, "[probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer
has violated the conditions of probation." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a)(i) (2003)
(emphasis supplied). Furthermore, "[pjrobation may not be revoked except upon a hearing
in court and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated." Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-1(12)(a)(ii) (2003). In other words, the sentencing court must reveal both "the
evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation" in order "to enable a reviewing
court to accurately determine the basis for the trial court's decision." State v. Hodges, 798
P.2d 270, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338-39
(Utah 1979) (noting that the reviewing function of an appellate court is seriously undermined
where findings are insufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which ultimate conclusions
are reached—in the context of a civil case, where no liberty interest was at stake). In the
instant case, the district court ordered Defendant Orr's probation extended, but entered no
"finding that the conditions of probation ha[d] been violated[,]" as required under section 7718-l(12)(a)(0 or (ii). Therefore, the trial court had no basis for ordering an extension of
Defendant Orr's formal probation under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(a)(i).
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In the context of an allegation that probation has been violated by a failure to pay
restitution, the standards are even stricter. Where the alleged violation is a failure to pay a
fine and/or restitution, the sentencing court "must either find that probationer was at fault or
that alternatives other than imprisonment are inadequate to meet the state's interests in
punishment and deterrence." See Hodges, 798 P.2d at 276 (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461
U.S. 660, 662 (1983)). As the Hodges court stated, "[w]e believe that... in order to revoke
probation, a violation of a probation condition must, as a general rule, be willful." Hodges,
798 P.2d at 276. In the context of an alleged failure to pay restitution (i.e. as grounds for
revocation/modification ofprobation), "a finding ofwillfulness merely requires a finding that
the probationer did not make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of his probation." State
v. Petersen, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotations, citation omitted;
emphasis in original). In the instant case, the district court made no finding that Defendant
Orr had violated any term of his probation, let alone that such an alleged violation was
willful. Without finding both a violation and willfulness (i.e. the absence of bona fide
efforts to pay restitution), the district court had no basis for ordering an extension of his
probation, even if this Court rules it still had jurisdiction.3 In fact, as noted previously,

3

If this Court chooses to reverse and remand on this issue, it is respectfully
requested the Court decide the other issue as well, because once the Court issues findings
upon remand, the same issue will need to be appealed again. Judicial economy should
dictate this result. "Although resolution of the above issue is dispositive of the present
case, where an appellate court finds that it is necessary to remand a case for further
proceedings, it has the duty of cpass[ing] on matters which may then become material.'"
Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, f 12, 20 P.3d 388, 393.
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Defendant Orr faithfully made his monthly restitution payments until the date he believed his
probation terminated by operation of law, and strictly complied with all other terms of his
probation for the entire thirty-six months. He therefore clearly made bona fide efforts to
meet the conditions of his probation.
POINT III. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE DISTRICT COURT
EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN ORDERING PROBATION
BEYOND THE STATUTORILY MANDATED TIME FRAME
AND STRUCTURE.
This Court did not grant certiorari on the issue raised by Defendant in the Court of
Appeals that the district court exceeded its authority in ordering probation beyond the
statutorily mandated time frame and structure; and so it is presumed that this Court in its final
decision in this case, will simply affirm the Court of Appeals' reversal of the district court
in ordering the Defendant on formal probation for ten years and remanding the case to the
district court for resentencing in accordance with its Opinion {See Add 6, State v. Orr, supra

11115, 16).
CONCLUSION
Defendant herein respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Utah Court of
Appeals and order the matter remanded to the Third District Court for the purpose of entering
an Order of Termination of Probation based upon the failure of the trial court to have
provided notice to Defendant of its intention to extend his probation until after his probation
was scheduled to terminate by operation of law.
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Furthermore, if this Court declines to reverse on the issue of due process notice as
indicated above, it is respectfully requested that this Court reverse and remand to the district
court for the purpose of holding a hearing to determine whether or not Defendant willfully
violated any condition of his probation, and instructing the district court that if it cannot so
find, Defendant's probation must be terminated. It is requested that the district court be
ordered to enter appropriate findings no matter what its determination with regard to the
alleged willfulness of Defendant's violation of probation.
Finally, this Court is asked to note in its decision that the finding of the Utah Court
of Appeals that the district court had exceeded its jurisdiction by extending Defendant's
probation for a period often years was improper, is the law of the case and the district court
should hold further proceedings, for the purpose of vacating its Order for probation extension
for ten years and providing for probation extension as allowed by law.
Dated this J L day of

^ W l

2005.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

^UL^
v

KELLER
L
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, by
first class U.S. postage prepaid, this H ^ d a y of H V ^ - M /
, 2005, to:
Laura B. DuPaix
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

\ktM^/hffi
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ADDENDUM 1

IN Thri SUPREME COURT OF THE S T A l ^ OF UTM&AH APPELLATE COUP

ooooo

MAR 3fl 2005

State of Utah,
Respondent,
v.

Case No. 20041057-SC

David J. Orr,
Petitioner.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on December 8, 2004.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted only as to the following issues:
1. Whether the due process concerns recited in State v.
Call, 980 P.2d 201, 203 (Utah 1999) require that a probationer be
notified of the State's intent to seek revocation, modification,
or extension of probation prior to the expiration of the existing
probation term.
2. Whether the district court made adequate findings, and
whether the district court must find a probation violation is
willful to impose an extension of probation.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.
FOR THE COURT:

Date

/

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice

ADDENDUM 2

Third Judicial Distnci

JUL - 2 2003
SALT LAKE COUNTY
BY-

•

Deputy ClerK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

: CASE NO. 001902772

vs.

:

DAVID JAY ORR,

:

Defendant.

:

This matter came before the Court for hearing on June 23,
2003, in connection with the defendant's Motion to Dismiss Order to
Show Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction.
from Robert Egelund,

The State elicited testimony

the defendant's AP&P

officer. The Court

received into evidence two exhibits, consisting of Mr. Egelund's
copies

of the Progress/Violation

Report

and the Affidavit

in

Support of the Order to Show Cause (both of which were originally
filed with the Court).
Following Mr. Egelund's testimony and oral argument from the
prosecution and counsel for the defendant, the Court ruled from the
bench that the defendant's Motion to Dismiss was denied and that he
was to make up the May and June restitution payments.
took

under

advisement

the

issue

of

whether

the

The Court
defendant's

probation may be extended to the limit or term of the original
sentence.

The Court also indicated to counsel that a more thorough

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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discussion of the Court's legal basis for denying the Motion to
Dismiss would be included in the Memorandum Decision that the Court
would issue.

Having now again reviewed the defendant's Motion to

Dismiss (the State did not file a-_response) and having considered
counsel's arguments and Mr. Egelund's testimony, the Court rules as
stated herein.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
In his Motion to Dismiss, the defendant contends that this
Court

lacks

proceedings

the jurisdiction
against

him

to

because

initiate probation

extension

these

were

proceedings

not

initiated until after probation had already terminated by operation
of

law.

The

defendant's

argument

is based

on an erroneous

presumption that his probation terminated on May 12, 2003, and that
the proceedings were not formally commenced until May 13, 2 0 03,
when he considers the Progess/Violation Report to have been filed.
The legal analysis of whether this Court has the jurisdiction
to extend the defendant's probation begins with an analysis of when
the extension proceedings were initiated in this case and when the
defendant's probation would have terminated.

As an aside, the

Court notes that the defendant takes issue with whether this Court
is even permitted to consider an extension of his probation given
that the filing of a Progress/Violation Report implies a potential
revocation proceeding and possible incarceration. According to the

STATE V. ORR
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defendant, such a Report is an inappropriate vehicle for seeking an
extension of his probation, even if it had been timely filed.
The Court
unimportant

concludes that

given

that

the

the styling of the report is

Court

has

a

wide

latitude

and

flexibility in determining whether probation should be revoked or
modified (including the possibility of extending the probationary
term) .

Because it is the Court and not AP&P that fashions these

remedies, how AP&P chooses to style the reports that it files with
the Court has no import in the Court's ultimate determination of
the appropriate remedy.

In this case, the Court opts for extending

the defendant's probation, as opposed to revoking it altogether.
Therefore, the Court will refer to these proceedings as a probation
extension proceeding. Having addressed the defendant's argument on
this point, the Court proceeds to analyze the timing of the filings
that initiated this probation extension proceeding.
Under Utah Code Annotated §77-18-1(11) (b) , " [t]he running of
the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation
report

with

the court alleging

a violation of the terms and

conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show
cause or warrant by the court."

The first issue therefore becomes

when the Progress/Violation Report was filed and whether it tolled
the running of the defendant's probation period under §77-181(11)(b).
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filing

date

for

the
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Progress/Violation

established by the credible testimony of Mr. Egelund.

Report

was

Mr. Egelund

testified that he met with the undersigned on May 9, 2003, and
pursuant to that, meeting, he returned to the Court on the same date
for the purpose of filing the Progress/Violation Report and the
Affidavit

in

Support

of

Order

to

Show

Cause.

Mr.

Egelund

specifically testified that on May 9, 2003, he brought copies of
these documents to the Court, date-stamped them and left them in
the intake basket for the Court's clerk.

In support of this

testimony, Mr. Egelund offered his copies of the Progress/Violation
Report and the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause (marked
Exhibits 1 and 2 ) .

A review of these documents indicates hand-

written changes to the May 9, 2003, date-stamp to reflect a date of
May 13, 2003. However, the copy of Order to Show Cause attached to
the Progress/Violation Report (Exhibit 1) has no such hand-written
change.

This copy of the Order to Show Cause clearly shows a date-

stamp of May 9, 2003.

Taking together the documentary evidence

before the Court in light of Mr. Egelund's credible testimony, the
Court finds that the Progress/Violation Report and the Affidavit
were filed on May 9, 2003, but that for reasons that the Court need
not delve into, hand-written changes were made to the date-stamp to
reflect

an

apparent

date

that

the

documents

were

docketed.

However, the pivotal date under §77-18-1(11) (b) is not the date of

STATE V. ORR
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docketing, but rather the date of filing.

In this case, this date

is easily determined by Mr. Egelund's testimony that he delivered
these documents to the Court for filing on May 9, 2003, and that he
date-stamped the documents himself with the date of May 9, 2003.
An alternative date for tolling the probationary period is the
issuance of an order to show cause.

The documents in this case

reflect that the Court approved and authorized issuance of the
Order to Show Cause on May 12, 2003.

Having established the dates

of May 9, 2003, or May 12, 2003, as potential dates for tolling the
defendant's probationary period, the Court now proceeds to evaluate
whether these dates occurred prior to the legislative termination
of the defendant's probation.1
The defendant was placed on probation by this Court on May
12, 2000.

The Court reasons that the first day of probation would

have concluded 24 hours after the sentence was imposed or at the
close of business on the following day, May 13, 2000.

1

Therefore,

During oral argument, the State alluded to a statement made
by the Court at a February 16, 2 0 01, hearing, as providing the
basis for concluding that the Court extended the defendant's
probation at that time. Although the Court indicated at that
hearing that the defendant's probation would not terminate
pending restitution being satisfied, this statement was not
intended as a suggestion that probation was extended or that a
violation in probation had occurred. For these reasons, the
Court does not rely on the February 16, 2001, date in its
analysis.
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the defendant's probation was set to expire by operation of law on
May 13, 2 0 03, the termination date of the defendant's 36-month
probationary period.
Progress/Violation

Accordingly, Mr. Egelund's filing of the

Report

on

May

9,

2 0 03,

and

this

Court's

authorization to issue the Order to Show Cause on May 12, 2003,
both

occurred

defendant's

prior

to

probation.

the

legislative

The defendant's

termination

of

the

probation period

was

therefore tolled either on May 9, 2003, or at the latest, May 12,
2003.
The tolling of the defendant's probation period prior to its
legislative

termination

sounds

a

death

knell

to

two

of

the

defendant's principal arguments. First, the defendant argues that
under §77-18-10 (a) (ii) (A), this Court can retain jurisdiction over
him' only under the form of a bench probation.

However, this

provision never comes into play because the defendant's probation
did not expire or terminate under §77-18-10(a)(i), but was instead
tolled under §77-18-1(11) (b) .
Second, the defendant argues that the due process concerns of
State v. Call, 980 P. 2d 201 (Utah 1999) , have been violated in this
case because he was not notified of the State's intent to extend
his probation before the expiration of his probation period.

Once

again, the holding in Call is not applicable to these facts because
the

defendant's

probation

did

not

expire,

it

was

tolled.
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Therefore, the service upon the defendant of the Order to Show
Cause on May 19, 2003, was within the probationary period and was
therefore appropriate under due process considerations.
Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that it has
jurisdiction
probation

to extend

extension

the

defendant's

proceedings

were

probation

initiated

because

prior

to

the
the

legislative termination of the probation period and served to toll
the probation period under §77-18-1(11) (b) . The defendant's Motion
to Dismiss is therefore denied.
Having concluded that the Court has jurisdiction to extend the
defendant's probation period, the Court next considers the issue of
whether the Court can extend the defendant's probation in 36-month
intervals

or

for the

full

duration of his

remaining

10-year

sentence (two terms not to exceed 5 years, to run consecutively) .
The Court's own legal research has not yielded a case or statute
addressing this precise issue. However, distilling the general law
on the trial court's discretion in matters of sentencing and
probation to its essence

provides that while the Court has a large

measure of flexibility, it must be exercised "within legislatively
established limits." State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988).
Further,

the

Court

can

find

no

express

limitation

on

the

permissible length of probation; only that the probation, together
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with any extensions, not exceed the

legislatively

established

sentencing guidelines.
Applying these concepts to this case, the Court concludes that
it has the discretion to extend the_defendant's probation up to the
remaining term of the Court's original sentence
years).

The

defendant's

failure

to

pay

the

(equating to 10
May

and

June

installments of his restitution underscores the fact that the
defendant is induced to repay his victims only when he is in the
shadow of probation and the threat of incarceration is held over
him.

Because the defendant's only incentive to continue making

restitution payments is to avoid his probation being revoked, the
Court invokes the full scope of its discretion to extend the
defendant's probation

for the maximum

length permissible, the

remaining full term of his sentence of 10 years.
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court,
denying

the

defendant's

Motion

to

Dismiss

and

probation in the manner indicated above.
Dated this

.day of'^n&f 2 003 .

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

extending

his

STATE V. ORR
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision and Order,

L^

day of<&sl5 2003:

Howard R. Lemcke, Jr.
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Larry R. Keller
Attorney for Defendant
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah
84147-0008
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the
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ADDENDUM 3

77-18-1

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 18
THE JUDGMENT
Section
77-18-1.

77-18-2.
77-18-3.
77-18-4.
77-18-5.
77-18-5.5.
77-18-6.
77-1&-6.5.
77-18-7.
77-18-8.
77-18-8.3.

Suspension of sentence — Pleas
held in abeyance — Probation
— Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension — Hearings — Electronic monitoring.
Repealed.
Disposition of fines.
Sentence — Term — Construction.
Reports by courts and prosecuting attorneys to Board of Pardons and Parole.
Judgment of death — Defendant to select method — Time
of selection.
Judgment to pay fine or restitution constitutes a lien.
Liability of rescued person for
costs of emergency response.
Costs imposed on defendant —
Restrictions.
Fine not paid — Commitment.
Special condition of sentence
during incarceration — Penalty.

Section
77-18-8.5.
77-18-9.
77-18-10.

77-18-11.

77-18-12.

77-18-13.
77-18-14.

77-18-15.
77-18-16.
77-18-17.

Special condition of probation —
Penalty.
Definitions.
Petition — Expungement of
records of arrest, investigation, and detention — Eligibility conditions — No filing
fee.
Petition — Expungement of
conviction — Certificate of eligibility -— Fee -— Notice —
Written evaluation — Objections — Hearing.
Grounds for denial of certificate
of eligibility — Effect of prior
convictions.
Hearing — Standard of proof—
Exception.
Order to expunge — Distribution of order — Redaction —
Receipt of order — Administrative proceedings — Division requirements.
Retention of expunged records
— Agencies.
Penalty.
Retroactive application.

77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension — Hearings —
Electronic monitoring.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(?) ^

On 3 T>le?» ^ f crvnl+v t r n f l t y ?*rtrl r n p n r a l l y i l l

n o r o n t p ^ t or r n n v i r f r i o n

of any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The
court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court.
730
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(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court,
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These
standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety, and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what
level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures
to implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and
other criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation reportfromthe department or information from
other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the
defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a. Crime Victims
Restitution Act.
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404,
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
department.
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel,
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to
731
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sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered
to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may
require that the defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, anyfineimposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense
Costs;
(hi) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation
by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use
of electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-1120.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment
services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with
interest in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims
Restitution Act; and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers
appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the
defendant's own expense if the defendant, has no I received the
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being
placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under
Section 64-13-21 during:
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(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10).
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions,
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period
under Subsection (lOXaXi), there remains an unpaid balance
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the
payment of the account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the
account to the Office of State Debt Collection,
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor,
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt
of court,
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will
occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to
revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
uf a h e a r i n g b j tu.6 piTGua.tlOu.ei Oi a p u n a u c < m n g o l i d a

finning

in

court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court
and afindingthat the conditions of probation have been violated,
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
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(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at leastfivedays prior
to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall makefindingsof fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the
court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at
the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2,
Government Records Access and Management Act. Nutwilualanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
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(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or
the subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime
on the victim or the victim's household.
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred
to the department in accordance with Subsection (16).
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order
of the court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions
which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all
times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this
section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the
residence of the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home
confinement to the department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to
be indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider.
History. C. 1953. 77-18-1. e n a c t s by T.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982, ch.
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, 5 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1;
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch.
212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114,
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1; 1990, ch. 134, § 2;
1991, ch. 66, § 5; 1991, ch. 206, § 6; 1992, ch.
14, § 3; 1993, ch. 82, § 7; 1993, ch. 220, § 3;
1994, ch. 13, § 24; 1994, ch. 198, § 1; 1994,
ch. 230, § 1; 1995, ch. 20, § 146; 1995, ch.
117, § 2; 1995, ch. 184, § 1; 1995, ch. 301, § 3;
1995, ch. 337, § 11; 1995, ch. 352, $ 6; 1996,
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§ 10; 1999, ch. 279, § 8; 1999, ch. 287, § 7;
2001, ch. 137, § 1; 2002, ch. 35, § 7; 2002 (5th
S.S.), ch. 8, § 137; 2003, ch. 290, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment by ch. 279, effective May 3, 1999, substituted references to accounts receivable under §
76-3-201.1 for references to fines, restitution,
and other assessed costs under Subsection 763-201(4) in Subsections (9) and (10); deleted
"upon order of the court" before "shall collect"
near the beginning of Subsection (9); added
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Amendment XTV. Citizenship; privileges and immunities; due process;
equal protection; apportionment of representation; disqualification of
officers; public debt; enforcement
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.

UECLARATION OF RIGHTS
chambeau, 1991, 820 P.2d 920
&> 1030(2)

Art 1 § 7

Criminal Law

Sec, 7. [Due process of law]
No]person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
No
of law,

ADDENDUM 4

TILED
IN THE 3 R D DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY
IN A N D FOR THE STATE OF

DEPUTY CLERK
T H E STATE OF U T A H
Plaintiff,

lAFFTDAVTT TN SUPPORT OF
:ORDER TO S H O W C A U S E

VS

: C O U R T C A S E N O : 001902772

ORR, David Jay
Defendant,

:JUDGE: Timothy R. Hanson
i D E F A T T Y : Larry R. Keller

S T A T E OF U T A H

)

C O U N T Y OF SALT LAKE
ROBERT EGELLND, being duly sworn upon an oath deposes and says that: He is a
Probation Officer for the Utah State Department of Corrections; that on the 23rd day of March,
2 0 0 0 , the above-named defendant was adjudged guilty of the crime o f Real Estate Broker/Agent
With Out License, 3rd D« gree Felony, Securities Fraud, 3rd Degree Felony, in the above-entitled
Court and on the 12th day o f May, 2000, w a s sentenced to serve a term o f 0-5 years in the Utah
State Prison; that the execution o f the imposed sentence was stayed and the defendant was placed
on probation under the supervision o f the Department o f Corrections; that the above-entitled
defendant did violate the terms and conditions o f the defendant's probation as follows, to-wit

/v\<W

/'"LiT-

RE: ORR, David Jay

1. By having failed to pay restitution in foil, as ordered, in violation of a special condition of the
Probation Agreement

WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an Orderfromthe Court issue directing and
requiring the above-named defendant to be and appear before said Court to show cause, if any
he/she has, why the aforesaid period of probation should not be revoked, and why said defendant
should not be forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison.

ROB:

JLjto. PROBATION OFFICER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

NOTARY PUB
Residing:
Commission expires:

Utah
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IN THE 3RD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff;
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

VS

COURT CASE NO: 001902772

ORR, David Jay

JUDGE: Timothy R. Hanson

Defendant,

DEF ATTY: Larry R. Keller

UPON A READING of the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause, the Court finds
probable cause to believe that the defendant in this matter has violated the terms and conditions
of his/her probation as set forth in the Affidavit, and that revocation or modification of
defendant's probation is justified.
IX IS ORDERED that the defendant appear before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson,
Judge of the above-entitled Court, at the Judge's courtroom in SALT LAKE, Utah, on the
da

y of
tfJajsi
°f HjOM

20^jat the hour of

ff'^^then

and there to show cause why probation

of said defendant should jot be revoked or modified by the Court based upon the allegations
contained in the AfSdavi; on file with the Court.

RE: ORR, David Jay

The defendant has arightto be represented by counsel at the above-described hearing and
to have appointed to represent the defendant if the defendant is indigent. The defendant also has
arightto present evidence as provided in the Utaji Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED THIS

IZS day oV

iq/Lt/j

20J2-*2>

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that this Order to Show Cause and Affidavit in support thereof, was
personally served upon the defendant at

^yrwv

5 Iff Ll- (yif^^jf

y p y showing the

original and informing the defendant of its contents, and delivering a copy on the \^f
Mft^

20QJ additional copies were delivered to frittf)

the defendant, on the JjJ^

day of

///ftf

ROBERT EGEL1

AlTnnUJfrf \

20^J

PROBATION OFFICER

day of

counsel for
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THORNE, Judge:
\ \ David Jay Orr appeals the trial court's extension of his
probation. Orr argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to
the expiration of his original probation period. We affirm all
aspects of the trial court's decision except for the length of the
extension of Orr's probation.

BACKGROUND
f2 Orr pleaded guilty to two third degree felonies in connection
with alleged fraud and securities violations. On May 12, 2000, the
trial court sentenced Orr to two consecutive prison terms of zero-tofive years. The court suspended all but six months of the prison time
and placed Orr on thirty-six months probation under the supervision
of the Utah Adult Probation and Parole Department (AP&P) . The court
also ordered Orr to pay $355,504.39 in restitution, with directions
that Orr was "to pay no less than $1,000 per month towards
restitution, or 25% of [his] income, under direction of AP&P."
\2 During his probation, Orr made thirty-four monthly payments of
approximately $1080. In May 2003, shortly before Orr's probation
period was due to expire, AP&P filed a probation violation report
stating that Orr had paid only $34,553.20 in restitution. AP&P
characterized this as a probation violation and asked the court to
order Orr to show cause as to why his probation should not be
revoked. The date stamp on the report reflected a filing date of May
9, 2003. The court issued an order to show cause on May 13, and the
order was served on Orr on May 19.
1(4 Orr moved to dismiss the order to show cause for lack of
jurisdiction. Orr argued that his probation expired by operation of
law on May 12, and that to continue his probation AP&P needed to file
its report and serve him with notice before that date. Based upon a
handwritten adjustment to the date stamp on the violation report, Orr
argued that the report had been filed one day late, on May 13. Orr
also argued that he had not been served with notice of the alleged
violation until May 19. Orr failed to make restitution payments in
either May or June 2003.
1)5 On June 23, 2003, the trial court held a hearing to consider
Orr's motion to dismiss. AP&P agent Robert Egelund testified that he
had filed the report on May 9, 2003. The trial court, relying on
Egelund f s testimony as well as the date stamp on the report, found
that the report was filed on May 9, three days before the expiration
of Orr's probation. The court ruled that the timely filing of the
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report tolled Orr's probationary period pursuant to Utah Code section
77-18-1 (11) , (1) and that this tolling provided the court with
jurisdiction to extend Orr's probation despite the May 19 service on
Orr. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11) (2003).
16 The trial court then extended Orr's probation for the full tenyear term of Orr's suspended prison sentences.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
17 Orr challenges the trial court's extension of his probation
pursuant to Utah Code section 77-18-1. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1
(2003). "Because the interpretation and application of a statute is a
question of law, we review whether the trial court had jurisdiction
to extend defendant's probation for correctness." State v. Martin,
1999 UT App 62,17, 976 P.2d 1224. Factual findings made by the trial
court are "reversed only if clearly erroneous." State v. Wanosik,
2003 UT 46,19, 79 P.3d 937 (quotations and citation omitted).

ANALYSIS
I. The Trial Court had Jurisdiction to Extend Orr's Probation
18 Orr argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to extend
his probation because one or more necessary events' 2 ' did not occur
prior to the expiration of his original probation term on May 12,
2003. (3) The trial court determined that AP&P filed its violation
report on May 9 and that this filing tolled the running of Orr's
probation. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11) (2003). Accordingly, the
trial court found that it had jurisdiction to extend Orr's probation.
19 Orr argues that AP&P's probation violation report was filed on
May 13, rather than May 9 as found by the trial court. "A trial
court's factual findings will not be reversed absent clear error."
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60,160, 28 P.3d 1278.
To demonstrate that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous,
the defendant "must first marshal all the evidence that
supports the trial court's findings. After marshaling the
supportive evidence, the appellant then must show that, even
when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
trial court's ruling, the evidence is insufficient to support
the trial court's findings."
Id. (quoting State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1l7 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108)
(emphases omitted). Viewing the trial court's decision in the most
favorable light, we conclude that it is supported both by the date

stamp on the document and by the testimony of AP&P agent Egelund-testimony that the trial court specifically found to be "credible."
We affirm the trial court's factual determination that AP&P filed its
violation report on May 9.
fllO "The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing
of a violation report with the court alleging a violation of the
terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to
show cause or warrant by the courtT"" Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11) (b)
(2 003) (emphases added). Accordingly, the trial court properly found
that the May 9 filing of the violation report tolled the expiration
of Orr's probation. Orr's original term of probation therefore had
not yet expired when he received notice or when the court entered its
extension order, and the court had jurisdiction to extend Orr's
probation.(4)

II. The Extension of Orr's Probation Had a Sufficient Factual Basis
til Orr next argues that the trial court had no authority to
extend his probation because it did not make a specific factual
finding that he willfully violated his probation terms. By statute,
"[p]robation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court
that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (a) (I) (2003) (emphases added) . The record
before this court adequately reflects the trial court's factual
determination that Orr violated the terms of his probation by failing
to make complete restitution. It was undisputed that Orr had been
ordered to pay over $350,000 in restitution and had actually paid
approximately $35,00 0. The record of Orr's hearing is replete with
statements from the trial court indicating the court's acceptance of
this factual basis, as is the court's written order.^ We conclude
that the trial court properly found that Orr had violated the
conditions of his probation by failing to complete the required
restitution.
fl2 Orr argues that even if he did fail to comply with the
probation terms, extension of his probation was improper because the
trial court made no finding that his probation violation was willful.
Willfulness is not an express statutory requirement for either
extension or revocation of probation under section 77-18-1(12).
However, this court has stated that "to revoke probation, a violation
of a probation condition must, as a general rule, be willful." State
v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Absent a finding
of willfulness or fault on the part of the probationer, revocation of
probation is appropriate only if a violation is found to "presently
threaten the safety of society," id. at 277, or, in the case of
failure to make payments of money] if other alternatives to
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imprisonment are found to be inadequate to m e e t the State's interests
in p u n i s h m e n t and d e t e r r e n c e . See id. at 2 7 6 ; see also Bearden v.
G e o r g i a , 461 U . S . 6 6 0 , 671-72 (1983) (holding that to revoke
p r o b a t i o n for failure to m a k e m o n e y p a y m e n t s the sentencing court
must either find that the probationer w a s at fault or that o t h e r
alternatives to imprisonment are i n a d e q u a t e ) .
Ul3 Probation r e v o c a t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s the loss of a
s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r interest--the p r o b a t i o n e r ' s liberty--than does
the m e r e extension of p r o b a t i o n a r y s t a t u s . Indeed, the value of the
right to p e r s o n a l liberty appears to have b e e n the underlying basis
of the H o d g e s d e c i s i o n :
"The right to p e r s o n a l liberty m a y be as v a l u a b l e to one
c o n v i c t e d of a crime as to one not so c o n v i c t e d , and so long
a s one complies w i t h the conditions u p o n w h i c h such right is
a s s u r e d b y judicial declaration, he m a y n o t be deprived of
the s a m e . S u c h right may not be a l t e r n a t i v e l y granted and
d e n i e d w i t h o u t just c a u s e . "
H o d g e s , 798 P.2d at 276 (quoting State v. Z o l a n t a k i s , 70 U t a h 2 9 6 ,
259 P. 1 0 4 4 , 1046 ( 1 9 2 7 ) ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , to t h e extent that the
requirements of H o d g e s can b e applied to the extension of probation,
we conclude that the trial court fulfilled t h o s e requirements.

1l4 The trial courtf s extension order stated that " [Orr] is
induced to repay his victims only when he is in the shadow of
probation and the threat of incarceration is held over him" and that
"[Orr's] only incentive to continue making restitution payments is to
avoid his probation being revoked." These statements constitute clear
findings that "alternatives other than [the extension of Orr's
probation] are inadequate to meet the state's interest in punishment
and deterrence." Id. No further finding of "just cause" is required.
Id.

III. Probation May Be Extended Only in Increments of the Original
Probation Term
1l5 Orr argues, and the State concedes, that any extension of
probation is limited to a renewal of the original probationary term.
We agree. "Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions
of probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-18-1(12) (e) (ii) (2003) (emphasis added). Accordingly,
the trial court's extension of Orr's probation for ten years, the
combined length of his suspended prison terms, was error. The
extension of Orr's probation on this occasion should not have
exceeded his original probation period of three years.
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CONCLUSION
fl6 We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its
jurisdiction over Orr when it extended his probation. The trial court
erred, however, by extending Orr's probation for a period of time
greater than that allowed by Utah Code section 77-18-1. We reverse
and remand this matter with directions that the trial
court amend Orr's probation order in a manner consistent with this
opinion.

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

117 WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. The trial court did not specify which version of Utah Code section
77-18-1 it relied on. For purposes of this matter, section 77-18-1
has not substantively changed since prior to Orr's sentencing, and we
will cite to the current version for convenience.
2. These events included AP&P's filing of the violation report, the
court's issuance of an order to show cause, and the receipt of notice
by Orr.
3. The parties dispute whether Orr's probation term was originally
scheduled to expire on May 12 or May 13. Because we conclude that the
running of Orr's probation period was tolled on May 9, we do not
reach this issue.
4. We note that, in certain circumstances, application of the tolling
provision, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (11) (b) (2003), might
implicate the due process concerns expressed in State v. Call, 1999
UT 42,111, 980 P.2d 201 (" [I]f it is the intent of the State to
extend the probationary period beyond its original term, the State
must take definitive action to extend the term before the expiration
date, and the probationer must be given notice of that intent.
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Otherwise, the probationer is left in a state of uncertainty, not
knowing whether to continue to observe the terms of his probation.").
We are not convinced that the limited delay between the filing of the
AP&P violation report on May 9 and Orr's receipt of notice on May 19
creates such problems.
5. At Orr's hearing, the trial court observed that " [On] hasn't paid
a nickel on his restitution since he thought probation was over."
Additionally, the court's July 2, 2003 order stated:
[Orr's] failure to pay the May and June installments of his
restitution underscores the fact that [Orr] is induced to
repay his victims only when he is in the shadow of probation
and the threat of incarceration is held over him. [Orr's]
only incentive to continue making restitution payments is to
avoid his probation being revoked . . . ."
These statements reveal an implicit but clear finding that Orr had
not paid the entire restitution amount ordered as a condition of his
probation. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271 (Utah 1998)
(upholding trial court's decision based on implicit factual finding
regarding jury prejudice).

